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In all Nordic countries, local government is the prime provider of public services 
to citizens and local communities. Predominant in terms of budgets and work 
force are ‘soft’ services, including school and pre-school education, and health 
and social services. For instance, in Norwegian municipalities these represent 
approximately 75 per cent of total spending (2015). In comparison, ‘hard’ 
services such as water supply, sewage disposal, waste management, housing and 
road construction/maintenance constitute a much smaller proportion of 
municipal budgets, about 10 per cent (2015). In Sweden, the corresponding 
figure is approximately seven per cent. Although the proportion of ‘soft’ versus 
‘hard’ services varies across Nordic countries, the big picture is the same: ‘soft’ 
services consume most of the budget and workforce.  
However, given that several ‘hard’ services are provided through municipal 
or inter-municipal companies, they are not necessarily included in municipal 
budgets, and are hence viewed as a smaller part of local government activity 
than is actually the case. For example, although Norway’s electricity supply is 
primarily provided by companies owned by and paying substantial dividends to 
local government, it is not formally registered as part of local government. Some 
‘hard’ municipal services are entirely financed by user fees in accordance with 
the principle of cost recovery financing, thus ‘protecting’ them from yearly 
competition for budget funds in municipal councils. Although included in the 
regular municipal budgets, a shielded economic position such as this probably 
reduces political attention and controversies concerning these ‘hard’ services.  
The composition of tasks at the local and regional government levels varies 
somewhat across Scandinavian countries. At the regional level, for instance, the 
proportion of ‘hard’ services in Norway is higher than in Denmark and Sweden. 
In Norway (2015), public transport is the second largest activity of Norwegian 
counties, representing 33 per cent of the budgets (compared to 48 per cent for 
upper secondary schools/high schools), whereas in Sweden it accounts for only 
9-10 per cent. Health care is the dominant regional sector in both Denmark 
(Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet, 2014) and Sweden, but in Norway this 
responsibility was transferred from the regional to the national government level  
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in 2002. In Denmark, regions and municipalities cooperate on public transport  
and organise and operate it through five regional public transport authorities 
(PTAs), such as Moravia in the eastern part of the country (Sørensen, 2018). 
To some extent, these factors may help explain why ‘hard’ services appear 
to attract much less attention from social scientists than their ‘soft’ counterparts. 
Sætren’s (2005) extensive review of the literature on public policy supports this 
view, highlighting a clear skew towards research topics focusing on traditional 
welfare sectors: 38 per cent of the studies were on education, followed by 15 per 
cent on health, nine per cent on the environment and eight per cent on social 
sectors. Comparatively few studies have been conducted on ‘hard’ sector 
services such as water, energy, transport and waste (see also Hill and Hupe, 
2002). More research on ‘hard’ services is consequently required. 
The situation described above, and the limited amount of research that exists 
within these service areas, stimulated us to look for scholars in the Nordic 
countries to contribute to this Special Issue of Scandinavian Journal of Public 
Administration: we wanted to find out more about the extent and orientation of 
social science research on ‘hard’ municipal services. The general response 
indicates that this research is rather limited, although we acknowledge that the 
small number of manuscripts submitted to this Special Issue does not provide a 
representative picture.  
In response to our call, we received nine papers for review, four of which 
were accepted for publication. Three focus on public transport and public road 
administration, while the fourth explores and compares strategies for developing 
environmentally-friendly housing.  
In this brief introductory article, we first outline a theoretical framework 
seeking to provide an overall view and understanding of the four articles. Next, 
we use this framework to arrange the main arguments and findings in the 
articles. Finally, we present some ideas about further research on ‘hard’ local 
government services. 
 
A Theoretical Framework 
In most if not all countries, the setting for public service provision is a multi-
level, multi-actor system. The provision of public services often involves more 
than one level of government, potentially creating challenges in coordination and 
accountability (Helgøy & Aars, 2008; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). The intention 
behind decentralising service provision to local or regional government is to 
encourage and promote better horizontal coordination, i.e. aligning 
responsibility, authority and resources to increase effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy. However, in many cases more than one level is involved in the 
provision of a service, such as the construction and maintenance of regional 
roads (Krogstad & Leiren, 2019). In other cases, one level may affect the 
conditions for another’s service provision, for example municipalities reducing 
the number of schools, thereby increasing the cost of regional public transport 
(Aarhaug & Rødseth, 2019). In addition, national government usually bears the 
authority to regulate service provision at lower levels through legal provisions, 
financial allocations and supervisory agencies. Depending on how the state 
utilises its power of vertical coordination, the capacity of municipalities and 
counties to develop and coordinate public service provision will be 
compromised. The tension that exists between horizontal and vertical 
coordination in multi-level systems seems to be a general phenomenon, a 
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coordination dilemma explained as “the impossibility of combining strong 
coordination of implementation processes at one level of government with strong 
coordination across levels” (Egeberg & Trondal, 2016: 579). Consequently, in 
order to make multi-level systems work, some type of balance has to be reached 
between these two coordination modes, termed Type I Governance (general-
purpose jurisdictions) and Type II Governance (task-specific jurisdictions) 
respectively by Hooghe and Marks (2003). The processes of reaching such a 
balance are embedded in institutionalised political and administrative relations 
between the levels, defining the national government as the pinnacle of the 
power pyramid and regional and local government as lateral subnational entities, 
i.e. there are three government levels, while the hierarchy of power only 
comprises two. This means that whereas in principle national government may 
exercise unilateral power over local and regional government as long it does so 
within the limits of the constitution, the two subnational levels of government 
must reach voluntary agreements between each other through market or network 
mechanisms. Commercial or cooperative arrangements are quite usual, but 
sometimes, for example in the case described by Aarhaug and Rødseth (2019) in 
this Special Issue, municipalities or counties may prioritise their own interests. 
Furthermore, in practice national government often uses market or network 
mechanisms to supplement the hierarchy mechanism (Bouckaert et al., 
2010/2016). 
The public sector is not just a multi-level system where the lower levels 
implement national policies. Given that municipalities and counties are governed 
by democratically elected assemblies and hold separate legal personalities, they 
are actors with their own interests, authority and legitimacy. Although autonomy 
and self-rule are still important values and basic features of the Nordic local 
government model, the development of the modern welfare state has gradually 
led to the increased integration of the three levels of government. Public service 
provision may thus be described as a large and rather complex multi-level, multi-
actor cooperative governance system. This also applies in the case of ‘hard’ 
services. The provision of these services may be even more complex than the 
provision of soft local services because they also tend to include public 
companies with considerable managerial and legal autonomy, private businesses 
and in some cases civic organisations.  
The ‘hard’ sector comprises services that are essentially technical in 
character. For example, knowledge of how energy systems work and how 
transport planning affects urban design requires technical/engineering expertise. 
In such sectors, one often delegates some responsibility to planners or 
consultants because they hold a specific competence that general civil servants 
and politicians in local government normally lack. This knowledge asymmetry 
may weaken the political control of the ‘hard’ services. Organising these 
services at arm’s length from local and regional politicians, for example in 
municipal companies, may weaken their control even further. Hence, exclusive 
expertise can depoliticise the linkage to civil servants and politicians by turning 
fundamental political questions into technical ones (Hansson, 2010, 2011). In 
science and technology studies, this is referred to as the dichotomy of technical 
vs. political spheres (Beaulieu et al., 2012). Such a disjuncture must be 
considered when analysing aspects such as accountability, trust, delegation and 
political control in ‘hard’ sector services. Therefore, the public sector should also 
be viewed as a multi-actor system, albeit without denying the special position of 
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national government. Further, the multi-actor conception of the public sector 
extends beyond the multi-level structure of government. Indeed, it may include 
several autonomous or semi-autonomous actors operating within and across 
levels. Examples of the former are publicly owned companies providing services 
like airports, waste management, port facilities or public transport.  
Many hard sector services hold large elements of contracting, often procured 
through competitive tendering. For example, in Sweden the public transport 
sector was opened for competitive tendering in the mid-1980s, and by 1995 
approximately 95 per cent of bus services were procured in such a way 
(Hansson, 2011). In 1996, marketisation spread to electricity production, 
resulting in a restructuring of this market as well. Several small companies (often 
owned by municipalities) and power plants (owned by the electricity-intensive 
industry) were purchased by producers such as Vattenfall and various corporate 
constellations that later became Fortum and Eon (Konkurrensverket, 2018). 
Therefore, today municipalities and counties often use tender instruments and 
either partially or wholly contract out the provision of several ‘hard’ services to 
private actors, thereby including them in the public service delivery system.  
In addition, there are numerous public actors working across levels, i.e. 
national agencies planning, supervising and sometimes also operating services at 
the local and the regional levels. For instance, national agencies regulate and 
supervise municipal water supply, and the same holds true for regional road 
construction and maintenance. Moreover, each country has a Competition 
Authority, which is a state agency working to safeguard competition and 
supervise public procurement in the relevant country. As many other services, 
hard sector services are subject to European Union (EU) regulation. Central here 
is the Competition Act, although there are also more specific acts pertaining to 
each service. For example, in the transport service sector countries must comply 
with the EU’s Public Service Obligation (PSO) for Public Passenger Transport 
Regulation (EC 1370/2007) (Lieberherr et al., 2019). 
If we add these features together, comprising multiple government levels 
and multiple actors, a rather complex context for local government service 
provision emerges, which poses considerable challenges for coordination and 
accountability. The intertwined responsibility relations between government 
levels, combined with corporatisation and the out-contracting of service 
provision at local and regional levels, have created a large and complicated 
service delivery system with inadequate transparency and opaque accountability 
relations. This is perhaps especially demanding in terms of ‘hard’ public services 
due to the competence gap between providers on the one hand and citizens, users 
and local/regional politicians on the other. 
 
The Articles 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the four articles.  
In their article titled “Coordination of regional transport policies: Insights 
from decentralization reform in Norway”, Krogstad and Leiren (2019) explore 
the implementation and implications of transferring political authority from the 
national to the regional level on the maintenance and construction of roads. Out 
of 19 counties, 18 opted against establishing their own road administration 
largely because they lacked the necessary expertise and financial resources to do 
so. In addition, strict national technical standards reduced the counties’ 
administrative discretion in road matters. Therefore, these counties left their 
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administrative tasks to the already existing regional subdivision of the national 
Public Roads Administration (Statens Vegvesen). Further, municipalities retain 
primary responsibility for spatial planning. Without a well-functioning 
collaborative network with the municipalities in their territory, counties may 
encounter some substantial stumbling blocks. Consequently, the 2010 reform 
contributed to political decentralisation and engagement, but it did not contribute 
to any major changes in how public transport and road matters were coordinated 
and administered.  
Aarhaug and Rødseth (2019) address similar challenges of coordination 
between government levels. In their article “Does regular pupil transport 
influence the provision of public transport services? Evidence from Norway”, 
they highlight how through merging schools, municipalities may shift the 
resulting increased cost of pupil transport to the county, which is responsible for 
most public transport within the territory in question. For municipalities, and 
especially for those that are sparsely populated, school mergers are economically 
beneficial, whereas for counties these decisions may have significant effects on 
the public transport services they can provide. Although the authors conclude 
that “the increased costs faced at the regional level are, on average, less than the 
savings made at the local level”, they admit that this varies significantly 
depending on geography. 
The third article regarding coordination challenges in multi-level service 
provision is by Lieberherr, Hansson, Leiren and Schmidt (2019), and is titled 
“Accountability adaptation and challenges: Contracting-out in the transport 
sector in Switzerland, Norway and Sweden”. In all three countries, public 
transport is controlled by the regional political authorities, but contracting-out 
models and thus accountability regimes vary. In Switzerland, the regional 
government of Bern governs the contracting-out process directly, leaving the 
operational transport provision to publicly owned private law companies. In 
contrast, the Norwegian county Telemark uses a more indirect contracting-out 
model, devolving the procurement process to an agency owned by the county. 
Having performed a tender, the agency then draws up contracts with private 
transport operators. Consequently, the model comprises two contractual 
relations, rendering the accountability regime more complex and opaque. The 
Swedish case is from the Kalmar region and the contracting-out model resembles 
the Norwegian case. However, in addition, Sweden has a free market concerning 
transport services, meaning that any transport operator may offer its services. 
Thus, in the Swedish model the regional government has the possibility to 
control the public transport tendering processes, but not the free market service 
providers. 
Lindblad’s (2019) article “Barriers in the public procurement process: 
Restricting long-term sustainable construction of wooden buildings” addresses 
the complex relationship between municipalities and private developers in new 
housing projects in Sweden within a setting of national regulative standards and 
procedures. In this country, the municipalities control the planning of new 
housing projects. Activities must abide by either the Public Procurement Act or 
the land allocation procedure depending on the relevant municipality’s 
development strategy. The paper shows that there are discrepancies in how 
municipalities and developers perceive land allocation activities. For example, 
the municipalities see themselves as sellers of land and seek to influence the 
projects according to their strategic ambitions, which is not a procurement 
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activity according to the Public Procurement Act. The developers, who must 
provide a detailed proposal of their intended solution, including activities in the 
pre-acquisition/acquisition phases of the procurement process, do not share the 
municipal view. These issues, combined with the general independence of the 
290 municipalities in Sweden, have engendered a complex situation with sub-
optimisation for the developers. The article also shows that instruments that are 
usually perceived as promoting efficient activity, such as national standards, 
equal evaluation methods and a defined procurement procedure, actually act as 
barriers to the development of wooden multi-family houses.  
 
Concluding Discussion  
The articles published in this Special Issue present cases of both multi-level and 
multi-actor governance.  
Krogstad and Leiren analyse a reform through which political responsibility 
for regional roads is transferred from the national to the regional government 
level. However, given that 18 of the 19 Norwegian regions lack the necessary 
resources and technical expertise, they are unable to establish their own 
administration for road affairs. Instead, they choose to rely on the regional 
division of the national Public Roads Administration. Officially, an important 
purpose of the reform was to increase coordination at the regional level between 
public transport (already a regional responsibility) and matters of road planning, 
construction and maintenance. As such, this may be viewed as an effort to 
strengthen the Type I Governance model described by Hooghe and Marks 
(2003), characterised by general-purpose, territorially defined jurisdictions (in 
this case the regions) at the expense of task-specific jurisdictions (road affairs), 
or so-called Type II Governance. Krogstad and Leiren’s article illustrates the 
practical and political limitations of implementing a Type I Governance reform 
and the opacity and tensions arising from having to combine this with a Type II 
Governance model in practice. 
In their article, Aarhaug and Rødseth explore how two levels of government 
– municipalities and counties – make their decisions as independent and separate 
actors, resulting in the externalisation of negative consequences and potential 
sub-optimisation. Given that the relationship between the two levels is non-
hierarchical, they rely on voluntarily coordinating their decisions in order to 
avoid hurting each other’s interests. In the study, the initiating parts (the 
municipalities) seem to be intent on reducing their costs by merging their small 
schools into larger units. The regions – which are responsible for public 
transport, including pupil transport – must therefore increase their costs, in turn 
stimulating them to reduce the scope and frequency of public transport more 
generally. Again, the problem seems to be how to combine territorial- and task-
based authority. Consequently, Aarhaug and Rødseth’s article illustrates how 
challenges emanating from the distribution of inter-related tasks between 
different government levels may intensify when the two levels operate as 
independent actors that are unwilling or unable to coordinate their activities. 
Lieberherr et al.’s article explores accountability problems caused by 
involving multiple actors in the provision of public transport at one government 
level, the regions. In all three cases (Switzerland, Norway and Sweden), the 
regional governments provide the service through tender and contracting-out 
regimes. The Swiss regime of direct contracting-out to private law, publicly 
owned companies experiences the fewest accountability problems. In Norway, 
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the contracting-out regimes are indirect, involving specialised public, 
autonomous agencies, which take care of the tender processes and primarily 
contract-out to privately owned companies. In these cases, the accountability 
problems are significant due to the detachment of the service operator from the 
political authority. The Swedish region has recently re-integrated the agency into 
the regional government administration, although to date this has made little 
difference in terms of accountability. The article offers a clear illustration of the 
challenges in combining general, territorially based democratic governance with 
the provision of specialised market-oriented services.  
Lindblad’s article also involves only one level of government, the municipal 
level. The essence of the article concerns how municipalities seek to implement 
an environmental housing strategy through cooperation with private developers. 
Although it only involves two actors, cooperation becomes problematic where 
municipalities and developers hold opposing conceptions of their relationship: 
Who is the buyer, and who is the seller? The article shows that even in a case 
with only two actors, significant problems can arise if the rules of the game are 
unclear or if insufficient time is spent in advance to clarify inconsistencies.  
The provision of ‘hard’ public services usually requires high and specialised 
competence, which may create specific challenges for their governance by 
democratic authorities. In addition, these services rely on expensive 
infrastructure and may cut across traditional territorial borders of municipalities 
and regions. Seen from a municipal or regional viewpoint, these services appear 
to require a territorial and population base larger than they can offer, rendering 
amalgamations or some form of inter-municipal/inter-regional cooperation 
necessary. Consequently, there is a more or less permanent tension between 
Type I Governance based on general-purpose jurisdictions and Type II 
Governance associated with task-specific jurisdictions. The first type implies a 
governance model consisting of few levels, such as those from the division 
between national, regional and local government. The second model may build 
on the first model when it comes to administrative levels, but often it does not. 
Both these models concern multi-level governance. When it comes to multi-actor 
governance, both cooperative arrangements and tender/contracting-out schemes 
seem to be quite widespread. 
This Special Issue has a strong focus on the role of local government as a 
‘hard’ service provider. In the future, we would like to see more papers 
addressing the challenges of exploring the management of the infrastructural 
systems that support these services. For example, many municipalities are 
struggling with increasing infrastructural maintenance costs. There is a 
permanent need to secure the running operational quality and capacity of the 
systems, as well as to modernise them in order to meet new environmental 
standards. We welcome more research on this theme. Infrastructural systems can 
also be addressed from a social-technical perspective, for example by studying 
difficulties in implementing changes or innovations due to interconnections 
between the different infrastructural systems within a municipality (Hughes, 
1987). Thus, we also welcome more research on this theme. Finally, the issue of 
de-territorialisation and “local authorities at risk from technical networks” 
(Offner, 2000: 165) appears to be a related and highly relevant topic when 
studying ‘hard’ local government services. This development, while of course 
challenging our basic conception of local democracy, deserves more attention 
from social science researchers in the future.  
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